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Over the years, Password-based Authentication (PA)
techniques have been the widely used security mecha-
nism that serves as a first level defence against unau-
thorised access. However, it is paramount that existing
PA techniques should be improved upon in order to
adequately protect computer systems and networks from
password attacks. Thiswork presents aOne-TimeServer-
Specific Password Authentication Scheme (OTSSPAS)
for preventing password related attacks. In this work,
two protocols known as Password Joggling Protocol
(PJP) and Account Management Protocol (AMP) were
developed and integrated with OTSSPAS. PJP involves
the use of a Password Security Key (PSK) in order to
dissuade adversaries from tapping the password. AMP
provides an enhanced account management system by
considering previous key activities of users in making ac-
count locking decision. OTSSPAS adopts MD5 standard
hashing technique for protection of passwords before
transmit and storage. Microsoft Visual C# and ASP.Net
programming languages were used to implement the
design. The evaluation result truly shows that the scheme
can prevent common password related attacks.
Keywords: authentication, password joggling, account
management, attacks, hashing
1. Introduction
Computer system and networks, which store
valuable resources of organisations, are increas-
ingly subject to attacks. The attackers have con-
tinually used different techniques to gain access
to computer systems. Over the years, many
security mechanisms such as identification and
authentication, audit trail, firewall, intrusion de-
tection system, encryption etc, have been put in
place to prevent unauthorised access resources
on computer systems. Consequently, there is a
need to continuously improve on current secu-
rity mechanisms in order to adequately protect
computer systems. Most of the security mech-
anisms that were developed in the past have not
completely prevented attacks on computer sys-
tem. Sodiya et al. (2006) stated that it is nec-
essary to continue to seek ways of improving
security of systems so as to be able to efficiently
prevent unauthorised access to these systems.
The most widely used security mechanism is
authentication. Authentication has two compo-
nents; namely identification and authorisation.
Identification is the means by which a user pro-
vides a claimed identity to a system, while au-
thentication is the means of establishing the va-
lidity of the claim (NIST, 2002).
The process of authentication requires that the
user supplies one or more authentication ele-
ments as proof of identity. The combination of
identifiers (i.e. credentials) is validated against
an authentication database. If the identity is
recognised, the user is allowed to have access
into the system. Identification and authentica-
tion are first line of defence against attacks for
most computer systems. Once the system is able
to identify and differentiate users, it can enforce
access control by preventing unauthorised peo-
ple or processes from consuming resources and
provide user accountability for authorised users
(NIST, 2002).
In the past, many forms of authentication were
developed. Some of them are password, identi-
fication card, external security device and bio-
metric authentication. Biometric authentication
uses the unique characteristics of human beings
to authenticate their identities. Fingerprints,
handprints, faces, retinas, voices, handwriting
signatures and keystroke timing can all be tied
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to a unique individual. The most widely used
authentication method is the password. The
password is the secret form of authentication
data used to control access to resource (Scott-
Chapman, 2006).
However, password-based authentication is the
most easily subverted method of authentication.
If a password is generated from a user’s iden-
tity, it might be easily guessed and therefore
easily cracked. If a security personnel enforces
a policy in which elaborate and incomprehen-
sible codes are used, these codes, when written
down, are exposed to unauthorised user. There-
fore, some of the existing password policies are
still weak with low entropy. Other problems of
password are safety and proper management of
password database.
In this paper, a One-Time-Server-Specific Pass-
word protocol that requires that a user remem-
bers a single password consisting of 8 random
characters and prevents the 13 prominent pass-
word related attacks is proposed. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
some related works and their weaknesses were
discussed. The proposed scheme is presented
in Section 3. In Section 4, the implementa-
tion procedure is described with some display
of screenshots captured during the implemen-
tation. Evaluation procedure is discussed in
Section 5. Finally, conclusion and future work
are presented in Section 6.
2. Related Works
In the past, a lot of meaningful contributions
were made to the improvement of password
authentication (PA) technique. Unfortunately,
most of these attempts are relatively inadequate
and cannot completely protect computer sys-
tems.
Victor and Robert (2004) provided countermea-
sure for six different PA related attacks. The
identified attacks are sniffing attacks, ID spoof-
ing attacks, brute-force attacks, relay attack, and
credential decryption. The measures provided
are not completely effective.
Blake et al. (2002)mentioned another important
attack known as keyboard monitoring. It was
shown that there are some daemon applications
that can listen to keyboard events sent to the
password field and record those keys in some
hidden fields. As a result, the daemon obtains
the clear text password. This attack made many
PA system less effective, it was not considered
while developing the many systems.
Viega (2004), Herzog (2001) and Anderson
(2001) have made tremendous contributions in
identifying PA related attacks. Generally, none
of them was able to identity all PA attacks and
provide convincing countermeasures. It should
be noted that a single and small security hole
can cause unimaginable security bridge.
Robert and Sawma (2003) presented counter-
measures for 7 e-commerce authentication at-
tacks. The work identified and implemented at
least a technique for preventing all the known
attacks. Out of the 7 e-commerce authentica-
tion attacks presented, the six that are related
to password-based authentication are sniffing
attacks, ID spoofy attacks, brute-force attacks,
Dictionary attacks and credential decryption.
A study of password and methods used in brute-
force SSH attacks was presented in Owens and
Mathew (2008). In their work, data were col-
lected from a large number of SSH brute-force
attacks against linux system connected to dif-
ferent kinds of networks. Patterns in password
used these attacks and methods were identified.
The work showed that the previous countermea-
sures, especially for bruteforce attacks are not
sufficient.
Lamport (1981) introduced the first hash-based
one-time password authentication scheme to de-
feat wire tapping or sniffing, but his scheme in-
volves very high hash overhead and practical
difficulty. Lin et al. (2001) presented an Op-
timal Strong Password Authentication (OSPA)
which claimed to be secure against stolen ver-
ifier attack, denial-of-service attack, replay at-
tack and impersonation attack. However, it has
been shown by Ku et al. (2002) that OSPA is
still vulnerable to stolen verifier attack.
Goyal et al. (2005) presented a scheme to counter
online dictionary attack. Their scheme was di-
vided into two protocols. They claimed that
the second protocol is more secure than the first
protocol. However, their scheme is suscepti-
ble to malicious server attack. An attacker who
can launch a malicious server attack success-
fully would not consider exploiting an online
dictionary attack.
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Mangipudi and Katti (2006) presented a Hash-
based Strong Password Authentication Protocol
with User Anonymity for better protection of
users’ passwords. They claimed that the pro-
tocol could prevent denial-of-service attack, of-
fline and online guessing attack, stolen verifier
attack and replay attack. However, the claim
that their work ensures user anonymity and re-
sists stolen verifier attack is wrong. An attacker
who has monitored the communication between
the user and the server may be able to track the
credential information transferred from the for-
mer to the latter. The attacker may now obtain
the key that can be used to derive the future ver-
ifiers from the captured credential information
by XORing the appopriate values.
Mohammed et al. (2007) presented an Anti-
phishingSingle PasswordProtocol (SPP)which
uses a one time password approach in solv-
ing sniffing attack and wire tapping, but they
have not considered the fact that the server
itself represents vulnerability. An adversary,
who gains access to the password file on the
server, can explicitly gain access to all pass-
word verification information, the usernames
and the stored random challenge, which greatly
increases the chances for a successful dictionary
attack. Moreso, the authors have not consid-
ered a situation wherein an attacker intercepts
a user’s login credential information in transit
and prevents it from getting to the server.
Kim and Koc (2008) recently presented an im-
proved authentication scheme. Their scheme
consists of 4 protocols, namely the Registra-
tion protocol, the Login protocol, the “Forget
password” protocol and the Password/Verifier-
change protocol. The weakness of their scheme
is described in the next paragraph.
The authors agreed that an attacker may be able
to derive PV in step 1 of the Registration pro-
tocol and Rs in step 2 of the login phase, after
monitoring the communication between U and
S. The attacker can also obtain
L∗ = h(h(K∗u ||P∗||U∗id)⊕PV ′)⊕h(K∗u ||P∗||U∗id)
after replacing the password P with P∗, the user
identity, Uid with U∗id, but cannot use it to lo-
gin on the server as the server can detect L
as modified. However, an attacker needs not
change the values of P, Uid and Ku to get au-
thenticated. An attacker simply needs to cap-
ture PV in step 1 of the Registration protocol
and L at step 3 of the login phase. Albeit the
value of L changes at every login due to the dy-
namic nature of Rs, an attacker may still deduce
h(h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕PV ′)⊕ h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕PV ′.
In order to do this, the attacker needs to capture
L at step 3 of the login protocol and derive
h(h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕ PV ′)⊕ h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕ PV ′
offline by XORing L with a large range of ran-
dom nonce, rs until Rs = rs. Since the at-
tacker nowhasPV and h(h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕PV ′)⊕
h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕ PV ′, he may replay PV to S at
login and obtain a random nonce, R since PV
is static in nature. The attacker thereafter com-
putes
h(h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕PV ′)⊕h(Ku||P||Uid)⊕PV ′⊕R
and use it to login at S successfully.
3. One-Time Server-Specific Password Au-
thentication Scheme (OTSSPAS)
OTSSPAS provides a scheme that improves on
Kim andKoc (2008) and other protocols to form
an enhanced password authentication.
The major design considerations in OTSSPAS
are;
• Improving existing accountmanagement sys-
tems, specifically the account locking fea-
ture, thus preventing denial-of-service at-
tack.
• Provision of an efficient countermeasure stra-
tegy for protection against 13 prominent pas-
sword-related attacks.
• Use of a one-time password resilient against
message replay attack.
General Notations in OTSSPAS
• Pu denotes the text containing the PSK en-
tered by the user at the password field.
• Pi denotes the password of the user, ID is the
username of a user and PSK is any arbitrary
sequence of characters chosen by the user at
login.
• i is the length of the user’s password (i = 8)
and j is the length of the PSK. (j = 4)
88 A One-Time Server-Specific Password Authentication Scheme
• U denotes the user’s score based on the cat-
egory of that user.
• h denotes a cryptographic hash function such
that h(a||b) implies the hash of a concate-
nated a and b and h2(a) = h(h(a)).
• ⊕ denotes a bit-wise XOR operator.
• n refers to the total number of login attempts.
• Es denotes the encryption with the public
key of the server.
• Ds denotes the decryption with the private
key of the server.
• N is a 24-bit random number.
• Alice is a client.
• S′ is the domain nameof themalicious server.
• S is the domain name of the benign server.
3.1. Password Joggling Protocol
This protocol involves the use of a Password
Security Key (PSK) in order to dissuade ad-
versaries from tapping the password from the
text entered by the user via key-logging devices.
Each password supplied by a user at login is in
the form Pu such that;
Pu = Pi + PSK
Users are meant to supply their passwords and
usernames at registration, but at login, users are
expected to supply their passwords along with
the password security keys at the password field.
The PSK is any arbitrary sequence of charac-
ters other than the password characters chosen
by the users at login. The password length is
chosen to be 8 and the PSK’s length is chosen to
be 4 so as to confuse a keylogger considerably.
3.2. Account Management
This scheme is introduced in order to prevent
account locking from genuine users. A gen-
uine user who mistypes or forgets his password
is expected to recollect it only after a few lo-
gin attempts. Account locking shall be done
strictly depending on the integrity of a user. The
integrity of a user shall be determined with re-
spect to three factors, namely: the user’s time of
operation, the user’s lock history and the user’s
category. Each of these factors shall be dis-
cussed in turn and a score between 0 and 1 shall
be dedicated for attributes within each of these
three factors and then userswill be awardedwith
these scores for the attributes they exhibit.
3.2.1. Time of Operation
This factor is aimed at detecting suspicious ac-
tivities such as online dictionary attacks. It con-
siders the login interval for consecutive login
attempts. The time of operation of a user is
considered normal if the login interval for three
login attempts is not below 3 seconds and odd
if vice versa i.e.
To = {(0, 1) : Normal ≡ 1 point,
Odd ≡ 0 point}.
3.2.2. Lock History
A user’s lock history refers to the number of
times a user account has been locked. A user
without any history of account lock scores a
point of 1 or 0 if vice versa i.e.
Lh = {(0, 1) : False ≡ 1 point, True ≡ 0 point}
3.2.3. Users’ Category
There are 3 categories of users in OTSSPAS,
namely: the frequent user, the normal user and
the rare user. A user shall be categorized based
on the total number of successful login attempts
denoted as Log, pertaining to that user and the
average of the total number of successful lo-
gin attempts denoted ‘A’ pertaining to all users.
Hence, we have:
U = {(0, 0.5, 1) : Frequent user ≡ 1 point,
Normal user ≡ 0.5, Rare user ≡ 0 point}
Such that
U = 0 if Log >= 0.5A
U = 0.5 if 0.5A < Log < A
U = 1 if Log < 0.5A
The integrity Score =
∑∞
n=1(U + To + Lh)/3.
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A user with an integrity score greater than or
equal to 0.83 is considered as a user with a high
integrity while users with integrity score less
than 0.83 are considered as users with low in-
tegrity. Account locking is hereby restricted to
users with low integrity only after 3 consecu-
tively failed login attempts.
3.3. One-Time-Server-Specific Password
Scheme (OTSSP)
The Password Joggling protocol and the Ac-
count Management Scheme are now integrated
into the One-Time-Server-Specific Password
Scheme. The OTSSP scheme is divided into
2 phases, namely: the Registration phase and
the Login phase. The two phases are described
below.
Registration phase
1. User → Server:
h(IDh||S)⊕ IDh, h(P||ID||S)⊕ IDh
The user inputs his ID and Pu into the client
system. The client system separates the
user’s PSK from Pu to get Pi. Thereafter,
the client system computes the user’s Tem-
poraryVerifier, TV= h(ID||S)⊕IDh and the
Password Verifier, PV = h(P||ID||S)⊕ IDh
where IDh = h(ID). Thereafter, the client
system sends TV and PV to the server. The
server now initializes To, Lh and U to a value
of 1 and calculates the integrity score of the
user. Then the server stores TV, PV, To, Lh,
U and the integrity score of the user in its
password file.
Login phase
1. User → Server: Es(IDh, h2(IDh||S))
The user enters his ID and password into the
client system. The client system computes
IDh and h2(IDh||S) and encrypts them with
the server’s public key before sending them
to the server.
2. User ← Server: N
The server derives IDh and h2(IDh||S) by de-
crypting Ds(Es(IDh, h2(IDh||S))). Then it
verifies h2(IDh||S) by XORing the IDh with
the TV stored in the registration phase to ob-
tain h(IDh||S) and susbequently h2(IDh||S).
If it verifies the received h2(IDh||S) as being
correct, it sends a random challenge, N to
the client system.
3. User → Server: PR
The client system now computes the one-




and sends it to the server. The server starts
to verify PR against the TV and PV stored
in the registration phase. Thus, the server
derives h(IDh||S) and h(Pi||ID||S) by re-
spectively XORing the TV and PV stored
in the registration phase with the IDh de-
rived in step 2 of the login phase. The
server now computes h2(Pi||ID||S)⊕ IDh ⊕
h2(IDh||S)||h2(h(P||ID||S)⊕N) and checks
if it matches with PR received from the user
before granting a successful authentication.
4. User ← Server: Success/Fail
The server notifies the user of either a suc-
cessful or a failed authentication attempt.
The server updates To, Lh and U and the
integrity score of the user. In the event of a
failed login attempt, the server checks the in-
tegrity score of the user as well as the value
of n, before making decisions about locking
the user’s account.
Assumptions
There are 2 assumptions in OTSSP Authentica-
tion Scheme (OTSSPAS). The first is that be-
fore OTSSPAS can execute the Secure Socket
Layer (SSL), SSL must have authenticated the
server using PKI certificate mechanism so that a
malicious server may not spoof another server’s
domain name successfully. The second assump-
tion is that users may provide valid telephone
numbers or e-mail addresses during registration
so as to provide users who may find their ac-
counts locked in the event of authenticationwith
a way to unlock their accounts. To this effect,
links or URL will be provided to users via e-
mails to direct them to a non-spoofed interface
within the web page on which they had reg-
istered their accounts in order to change their
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passwords before reactivating their accounts.
Temporary authentication codes may be sent to
their mobile phones for reactivating their ac-
counts when they find difficulty in accessing
their accounts.
4. Implementation and Security Analysis
This section discusses the implementation pro-
cedure and different ways of analysing the pro-
tocol considering common attacks.
4.1. Implementation
OTSSPAS was implemented with Visual C# on
ASP.Net platform. The following screenshots
display some of the modules in the proposed
protocol. Figure 1 illustrates the response from
the server indicating a failed login attempt by a
user after entering an incorrect password.

Figure 1. The login phase of OTSSPAS.
The server, implemented with ASP.Net is de-
signed to autoload/refresh every 5 seconds to
reflect the log saved in the database. The
server’s response to one of the login processes
is shown on the screenshot displayed in Figure
2.
Figure 3 shows a detailed information about the
integration of the PJP and AMP. It displays the
Client name, Client Password and PSK. The
Client computes the MAC after separating the

Figure 2. Server response for incorrect login.

Figure 3. Server response for correct login.
actual password from PSK. The server com-
putes MAC using the stored TV and PV. On
carrying out this computation, there is an equal-
ity in the Client MAC and Server MAC as seen
on the screenshot. The Client is then authenti-
cated and server updates the components of the
AMP.
4.2. Security Analysis
An analysis of OTSSPAS was conducted on a
LAN within the Computer Science Lab in the
University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria.
100 registered students with the department’s
site within this network were given access to the
systems within a period of 6 weeks in order to
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evaluate the security of OTSSPAS against each
of the considered password-related attacks.
This section briefly demonstrates that our pro-
posed scheme is secure against some attacks, to
mention but a few, keylogging attack, dictionary
attack, brute-force attack and server spoofing
attack.
4.2.1. Keylogging attack
A keylogging attack is aimed at tapping the
user’s password after tracking or logging the
keys struck on the keyboard so that the retrieved
password may be used in an online dictionary
attack. A keylogging software was installed
on each of the systems in the Computer Sci-
ence Lab in order to monitor the login of each
student. After the students had accessed the
computer systems over a period of 6 weeks, it
was observed that 25% of the students chose
passwords that can be found inside the English
dictionary, 70% of the students chose passwords
that are names combined with other characters,
1.5% of the students chose passwords that could
not be ascribed to any meaning while 3.5% of
the students chose passwords that are combina-
tion of characters and numbers. A list of the
passwords entered at the password field by the
students was compiled. The captured list of
passwords was tested at a later time in order to
login at the server after the account locking fea-
ture of OTSSPAS had been disabled. None of
the collected passwords were used to login suc-
cessfully. This was as a result of the inability to
locate the actual password within the sequence
of characters entered into the password field by
the students at login.
4.2.2. Dictionary attack
An attacker tries to login with every word in
a dictionary in this kind of attack. However,
OTSSPAS is secure against this kind of attack
because the integrity of such attacker pretend-
ing to be a user continues to diminish until the
attacker is locked out.
A total number of 5 attack dictionaries were col-
lected from the internet with an aim of deducing
if the passwords chosen by the students could
be found on the lists. The passwords listed in
the dictionary contained words typically with
length of less than 8. None of the passwords
chosen by the students were found in the attack
dictionaries.
An attacker tries every word in a password dic-
tionary against a password verification informa-
tion in order to derive the password. However,
taking the average number of guesses in an of-
fline dictionary attack to be a standard value of
10000000 and the standard time required in hash
computation to be 0.005ms, an attacker needs
up to (688 · 224 · 10 000 000 · 0.005 · 0.001) sec-
onds to derive the user’s password. It is thus
practically infeasible to derive the user’s pass-
word in an offline dictionary attack.
4.2.3. Brute-force attack
In order to test the system with brute-force at-
tack, thirty more students that had not partaken
in the previous exercises were supplied with the
password file of the students who had earlier
registered with the server. The 30 students had
a job to supply password guesses to the system
until they were able to derive any MAC found
in the password file. This exercise lasted for a
total of 14 hours within 4 different days. Yet,
the students could not derive any MAC listed in
the password file.
An attacker launches this kind of attack by first
obtaining the password file containing the pass-
word verification information of all users and
for every possible combination of characters,
the attacker tests whether it is the correct pass-
word. OTSSPAS is secure against this type of
attack because the attacker requires testing up to
a total of 688 combinations of characters along-
side 224 different combinations of 24-bit ran-
dom number simultaneously, which takes years
to accomplish.
4.2.4. Server spoofing attack
A malicious server aims at stealing the chal-
lenge stored by the benign server for a client,
such that that client also has an account with the
malicious server. The malicious server thus re-
plays the same challenge stolen from the benign
server to its clients with the aim of receiving the
MAC that it may use to login at the benign server
at a later time. OTSSPAS is secure against this
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kind of attack because each MAC is specific to
the server that the MAC is sent to. An attacker
cannot forge another server’s identity because
SSL handles server authentication using PKI
certificates. A simple illustration of a scenario
wherein an attacker obtains the MAC from the
user after sending him/her a stolen challenge is
given below.
1. Alice → Server: Es(IDh, h2(IDh||S′))
2. Alice ← Server: N
3. Alice → Server: h2(Pi||ID||S′) ⊕ IDh ⊕
h2(IDh||S′))||h2(h(P||ID||S′)⊕ N)
It is to be noted that PR = h2(Pi||ID||S) ⊕
IDh⊕h2(IDh||S)||h2(h(P||ID||S)⊕N) is dif-
ferent from what is sent from Alice to the
server at step 3. Hence a malicious server
cannot replay what it receives from Alice
back to the benign server.
5. Conclusion
OTSSPAS successfully addresses the 13 promi-
nent password-related attacks. A password file
compromise on the server will only result in
leaking the temporary User Verifiers, UV and
the Password Verifier, PV, but not the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) which is actually
used in verifying both verifiers. The use of the
MAC has also provided a One-TimeServer Spe-
cific Password Scheme for OTSSPAS because
the MAC used in identifying each user is com-
puted dynamically with respect to the challenge
the user receives from the server as well as the
server’s identity. Hence, OTSSPAS is clearly
resilient tomessage replay attack, andmalicious
server attack. The server is involved with only
a total of 4 computations of a one-way forward
hash function in order to authenticate each user
inOTSSPAS. This shows that the computational
load on the server is less, which in turn enhances
the efficiency of OTSSPAS. Finally, the evalua-
tion results show that OTSSPAS can prevent 13
related password attacks.
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